

June 2026 • NYSE: CCJ • TSX: CCO

Cameco Corporation

Uranium & Nuclear Fuel Cycle Company

Rating

SELL

1 Year Growth

+56.18%

Share Price

\$108.95

Investment Summary

Fundamental Analysis outlines a current premium with the market mispricing the stock

I issue a **SELL** recommendation with a 12-month target share price of **\$81.39**, representing a **25%** discount on the current share price



Market Mispricing - DCF and relative valuation both indicate ~30% downside from current levels



Unsustainable Growth - Reverse DCF implies the market is pricing in 7.6–8.5% perpetual growth



Westinghouse Acquisition - The 49% equity-method stake adds ~\$5/share but cannot bridge the valuation gap


SELL RECOMMENDATION




Business Overview

A tier-one integrated fuel platform with a dominant upstream position

The Western world's top producer of Uranium...




...controlling a large share of the world's Uranium production



...and diversifying revenue streams with additional production

Sales Volume by Segment 2021-2025 (millions)



Industry Overview

Nuclear tailwinds are real...but already priced into Cameco's market price

Demand Drivers

COP28

31 nations committed to tripling global nuclear capacity by 2050

Energy Security

Geopolitical disruption has accelerated Western decoupling from Russian supply (35% globally)

AI Boom



Hyperscalers (MSFT, Google, AMZN) signing nuclear offtake agreements for baseload power

Supply Deficit


Global uranium production covers only ~75% of reactor requirements; gap filled by secondary supplies which are depleting



5 Year Returns Cameco vs Uranium Spot Price



Cameco's Competitive Position




Financial Analysis

Revenue growth is consensus; margins must do the heavy lifting

3-statement snapshot | FY2025A-FY2030F

	FY25A	FY26F	FY27F	FY28F	FY29F	FY30F
Revenue (\$bn)	2.49	2.30	2.55	2.71	2.74	2.95
EBITDA margin	25.1%	27.4%	31.5%	34.2%	35.2%	38.5%
Net income (\$mm)	422	500	644	760	807	955
EPS (\$/sh)	0.97	1.15	1.48	1.75	1.85	2.19

Revenue & EBITDA Margin | FY2025-FY2030




Key assumptions (base case)	FY2026	FY2027	FY2028	FY2029	FY2030
REVENUE DRIVERS					
Uranium sales volume (M lbs)	30.5	31.0	32.0	28.0	27.0
Uranium spot price (USD/lb)	\$85	\$87	\$90	\$92	\$95
Fuel services volume (M kgU)	13.5	14.0	14.0	13.5	13.5
PRICE & CASH FLOW DRIVERS					
Realised U price (USD/lb)	\$62.5	\$67.1	\$71.0	\$74.0	\$79.8
Capital expenditure (USD mm)	\$370	\$295	\$275	\$265	\$260
WEC equity income (USD mm)	\$251	\$274	\$298	\$319	\$340

8.5%


Implied perpetual growth at the current share price

Reverse DCF assumes a 9.0% WACC and average of \$240,997 FCF over FY2026-FY2030 period

Growth assumption comparison



Benchmarking the 8.5% reverse-DCF output



Thesis II: Valuation Framework

DCF is the anchor; multiples are a cross-check, not the target

WACC anchor

9.02%

Base-case WACC from direct CCJ beta

Risk-free rate	4.43%
Adjusted beta	0.98x
Equity risk premium	4.69%
Cost of equity	9.12%
After-tax cost of debt	3.16%

Peer-unlevered beta cross-check: 6.64% WACC

Why not MSCI Energy beta?

Energy-sector beta imports oil & gas cyclicality into a uranium contractor with fuel-services exposure. It understates the stock-specific volatility visible in CCJ trading data.

Risk: false precision from the wrong sector proxy

Bloomberg exit multiple issue

An exit multiple tied to today's uranium peer premium risks circularity: it capitalises the same market enthusiasm this pitch is testing.

Use multiples as a cross-check, not the target

Framework decision

- 1 DCF receives primacy because it forces explicit assumptions on uranium pricing, capex and terminal growth.
- 2 EV/EBITDA is retained only as a sanity check: the peer-implied value is still materially below the market price.

Bloomberg DCF Predicts a share value of \$209.86 but...

1. **Bloomberg Exit Multiple | 73.3x EV/EBITDA** | Re-inputs today's peak trading multiple as terminal assumption.
2. **Implied WACC | 14.6% WACC** | Internally contradictory: High WACC + peak multiple

DCF output summary

PV discrete UFCF

\$879mn

7% of enterprise value

PV terminal value

\$11,723mn

93% of enterprise value

Enterprise value

\$12,602mn

DCF operating value

UFCF build pressure point

FY2026 UFCF begins at only \$54mm after taxes and capex; the DCF relies on recovery to ~\$399mm by FY2030 and a large terminal-value contribution.

Equity bridge to per-share value

Enterprise value	\$12,602
+ Westinghouse stake	\$2,179
– Net debt	(\$739)
Equity value	\$14,041
÷ FD shares	435mm

Base-case equity value / share

\$32.3

~70% downside vs. \$108.95 current price

Market-price hurdle

The DCF grid never reaches the current share price.

\$108.95
Current price

DCF scenario	\$/share	vs. \$108.95
Bear	\$15.0	–86%
Base	\$32.3	–70%
Bull	\$51.5	–53%

All 3 scenarios imply massive downside – the value has been priced in already.

Revenue & EBITDA Margin | FY2025–FY2030


\$/Share	2.75%	3.25%	3.75%	4.50%	5.25%
8.0%	\$33.6	\$36.5	\$40.2	\$47.6	\$59.0
8.5%	\$30.5	\$32.9	\$35.8	\$41.5	\$49.7
9.0%	\$28.0	\$29.9	\$32.3	\$36.7	\$43.0
9.5%	\$25.8	\$27.4	\$29.3	\$32.9	\$37.8
10.0%	\$23.9	\$25.3	\$26.9	\$29.8	\$33.7

Relative Valuation

Peer comps confirm downside, but do not override the DCF target



Valuation Football Field (USD/Share)



FY26 EV/EBITDA peer set

Cameco	32.3x
Centrus	48.2x
BWX Technologies	29.7x
Constellation	13.1x
Kazatomprom	6.6x
Peer mean	23.6x

Cameco's premium demands a better outcome than the model's base case.

DCF base

\$32.3

EV/EBITDA base

\$70.1

70/30 blended base

\$43.6

70/30 blended bull

\$81.4


70/30 blended bear

\$19.18



Risks

Upside risks are real, but require a material break from the base case



Conclusion

The uranium bull case is already capitalised...

Recommendation

SELL

\$81.39

12-month target price

≈25.3% downside from
\$108.95

The pitch in three conviction points

1

Reverse DCF implies stretched long-term assumptions

Justifying today's share price requires ~8.5% perpetual growth versus a 3.75% base case model terminal growth rate.

2

DCF output remains far below market

Even with 93% of enterprise value from terminal value, the base case reaches only \$32.3/share.

3

Relative valuation is a cross-check

FY26 EV/EBITDA peer work implies ~\$70/share — still well below the current price, so it cannot overturn SELL.

...but:

What would change this view?

Durable realised uranium pricing above the base case, faster WEC profit conversion, or regulatory/fuel-security catalysts that lift free cash flow without expanding terminal-value risk.